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May 3, the World Press Day, was broadly noticed in Ukraine for the first time lately, as a good chance to think again
about the freedom of speech - or the lack of it - in Ukraine, on dependence or independence of the Ukrainian media.
Discussions of this general issue and its possible variations have been increasingly frequent: the current realities of
the country's development produce plenty of material for questions whether the media in Ukraine are really the
fourth estate , as the role of the media is perceived in established democracies, or simply servicing agencies for the
branches of the state tree , individual members of the Ukrainian political class or those who are routinely referred to
as representatives of oligarchic structures .
This year the May 3 day was marked by the Action of Free Journalists, the Wave of Freedom. The action started on
April 13, 2000, in Lviv, where journalists of a local newspaper, the Express, protested against the pressure of local
authorities and the court judgment ordering them to pay multi-thousand compensation for moral damages ,
reportedly caused by a 12-line note published several months ago. At the beginning of May the Freedom Barricade
built by the protesters was moved from Lviv to Kyiv. The journalists demanded amending the Ukrainian legislation
so that to specify the upper limit of compensation for moral damages that can be demanded on a media outlet, and to
introduce criminal liability of civil servants for deliberately preventing journalists from performing their
professional duties. The demands were supported by 198 newspapers, 19 TV stations, 36 radio stations, and
chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Freedom of Speech and Information Oleksandr Zinchenko and
chairman of the National Association of Journalists of Ukraine Igor Lubchenko.
Although attitudes to the action itself may vary - for there have been a number of those willing to benefit from the
free publicity created by the event - the Wave of Freedom highlighted key problems of the Ukrainian media
development. Currently it is still unclear whether the spark will actually grow into fire , as the effect of the action
still remains to be evaluated. Yet, the Ukrainian realities have been creating increasingly favorable conditions for
proliferation and radicalization of journalists' protests. As Igor Lubchenko put it, every year the strain on the
freedom of speech in Ukraine becomes increasingly blatant...
In May 1999, the US-based International Committee for Protection of Journalists included the name of Ukrainian
President Leonid Kuchma to the list of top ten enemies of the press , alongside with leaders of some African and
Asian dictator regimes and the President of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milocevich. Shortly after the news reached
Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma stated that had been his enemies' conspiracy. I can tell you with absolute responsibility
that behind my position [in the ranking] there is one of Ukraine's political forces that bought that position for money
for the President of Ukraine. That is it. Everything in the world can be sold and bought, including in the United
States of America (Den, September 1, 1999). Commenting on the nomination of the Ukrainian President among the
enemies of the press , U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Stephen Pifer argued he could not imagine how that ranking was
formed. According to Mr. Pifer, knowing problems faced by the media in other countries worldwide, he would not
regard the Ukrainian press as being among the ten most suppressed ones in the world (Fakty I Kommentarii,
September 17, 1999).
In 2000, the Ukrainian President's name was not in that list. Either the situation with the freedom of expression in
Ukraine had improved, or it had gone worse somewhere else, and there was a need to vacate the position for new
media-unfriendly leaders - like, for instance, President of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev. Yet, no position in any sort of
ranking can reflect the acute and multidimensional problem of the media freedom in Ukraine in full. The challenges
faced by the media in this country have to be considered in the context of civil society building that Ukraine has
been trying to pursue for almost a decade.
As of the end of 1999, Ukraine had 8,300 officially registered print media (though only about 3,000 of them
published regularly), and over 800 TV and radio stations. Hence, compared to mid-1990s, there has been a
noticeable increase in numbers. Though, the growth process has been accompanied and largely determined by the
development of relations between the media and the national and local authorities. The issue if the status of the
freedom of expression and ways to promote media independence have occupied a prominent place in the civil
society-building agenda.
No matter how indefinitely broad the issue may appear, the current challenges to the media in Ukraine can be
classed into issues related to the imperfection of the legal framework, the issue of direct or indirect dependence of
the media on certain financial-political circles, and fully legitimate mechanisms of influencing the media that at
certain points may be easily transformed into pressure. Remarkably, the pressure in such cases will be exerted
through mechanisms that are completely within the law.
As far as legal provisions for the media freedom and journalism are concerned, one should note that Ukraine's media
laws are among the most democratic ones in the post-Soviet states. Specifically, Article 15 of the Constitution of
Ukraine declares that censorship is prohibited . According to Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine, everyone is
guaranteed the right for the freedom of thought and speech, for free expression of his views and beliefs. The
parliament of Ukraine adopted relevant bills - On Information , On the Print Media , On Television and Radio
Broadcasting , On the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting , On Information Agencies , On
Advertising , On the Order of Covering Activities of Bodies of State Power and Local Self-Governance , On Public
Television , On State Support for the Mass Media and Social Protection of Journalists . The bills have shaped the
legal framework for the media operation. However, one of key challenges to the media freedom in Ukraine today is
the possibility to interpret the law in such a way as to gain opportunities of indirect pressure on the media.
The last of the above list of bills, On State Support for the Mass Media and Social Protection of Journalists was
approved by the parliament in 1997 and created legal provisions for the state to support the selected media which, in
their turn, would support the state machine and its individual elements. Provisions of the law On Information -
adopted, by the way, in October 1992 - stipulating the right to receive information and liability for refusal to provide
it are practically unenforced today.
There is yet another major problem: unlike in established democracies, the Ukrainian law does not guarantee
protection of the sources of information that can be disclosed only after a relevant court judgment. The lack of this
norm often forces Ukrainian journalists to refrain form including any specific details in their publications that may
allow identification of the source.
The relations of the Ukrainian media with the third estate , the judiciary, have not developed smoothly. The general
picture of the number of lawsuits and trials against journalists and the media, and amounts of compensation for
moral damages allegedly caused by media publications, was disclosed in December 1999 by then chairman of the
parliamentary Committee for Freedom of Speech and Information Ivan Chyzh. He argued that the amount of
compensation of moral damages claimed on journalists and the media through lawsuits totaled UAH 90 billion,
though the total of compensations awarded to plaintiffs by the courts was far more modest - about UAH 1.5 million
(Vechirniy Kyiv, December 14, 1999).
Last year Ukrainian media had been sued over 2,000 times for the total of UAH 90 billion, or almost three times as
much as the country's whole budget. Commenting on the problem, Deputy Director of the Institute of Journalism
Valery Ivanov argued that over 70 percent of lawsuits against the media are groundless. The plaintiffs just act
dishonestly. In reality they do not seek protection for their honor and dignity, but [strive to] destroy the publication
financially... (Express, Wave of Freedom).
This method of pressure on the media has become possible because the Ukrainian legislation does not clearly
specify criteria of liability of a journalist and, on the other hand, does not stipulate that a claimed compensation
cannot be large enough to drive the publication bankrupt. Therefore, lawsuits, claiming exorbitant amounts as
compensation for moral damages have been used as an indirect mechanism of exerting financial pressure on the
media and the best way to limit the freedom of expression. Remarkably, the possibility was suggested to power
brokers trial procedures. Within a short period of time they imposed the functions of an instrument of financial
pressure on the media on the courts. While a compensation for physical harm caused to a person, awarded by the
court, normally does not exceed 200 minimum salaries (currently an equivalent of about US$ 4,800), journalist and
the media were demanded hundreds of thousands or even millions for moral damages they had allegedly caused.
This absurd habit of civil servants and politicians to use the court against the media by claiming disproportionately
large financial compensations could be limited by amending the legislation with a provision that a certain deposit (at
least 30 percent of the claimed compensation) should be made by the plaintiff. The National Association of
Journalists of Ukraine, led by Igor Lubchenko, campaigned for introducing such an amendment jointly with a
number of newspaper editors. In 1997 they appealed to the Chairman of the Supreme Court, urging to clarify the
notion and features of moral damages , though regarding the idea to be a democracy gain that is proper for a
civilized state (Pravda Ukrainy, June 13, 1997). The journalists demanded that moral damages lawsuits be
suspended until relevant clarifications were made. Obviously, their campaign was in vain, for the quite legal method
of suppressing the freedom of speech was too convenient for power brokers to give up. In 1998 journalists made
another effort to initiate parliamentary debates on amendments that would disallow disproportionately high claims
for moral damages caused by media publications. President Leonid Kuchma also promised to propose a draft
amendment to the current media legislation that, if adopted by the parliament, would oblige the plaintiff to deposit
20 percent of the claimed damages and, if the case against the media outlet is lost by the plaintiff, the deposit would
be transferred to the state budget (Kievskie Vedomosti, July 7, 1997). However, no change has occurred, and
lawsuits of offended civil servants and politicians have led to liquidation of whole media teams.
The problems of the troubled relationship between the media and authorities deteriorated during election campaigns.
In 1998, a lawsuit resulted in a major halt of the Vseukrainskie Vedomosti. By the judgment of the Chernivtsi
regional court, the newspaper had to pay UAH 3.5 million to the Dynamo Kyiv Football Club for publishing
information about a planned US$ 17 million contract of the club's lead player, Andriy Shevchenko, with the Milano
club. Thus, the high-ranking football fans dealt a skillful blow to the publication that sympathized with ex-prime
Minister Pavlo Lazarenko. In June 1998 a Kyiv-based borough court ordered the Kievskie Vedomosti to pay UAH 5
million as moral damages to Minister of the Interior Yuri Kravchenko for a series of articles charging him with
power abuse and misuse of public funds. Two authors of the articles also were ordered to pay the plaintiff UAH
20,000 and UAH 7,000. However, half a year later the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the borough court's
judgment.
The Ukrainian media have their steady political preferences. There is the whole spectrum of officially partisan
publications, like the Socialist Party's Tovarysh, the Communist Party's Komunist, or the Chas newspaper of the
wing of the Rukh led by Hennady Udovenko. The Silski Visti were consistent in their support for the Peasants' Party
leader Oleksandr Tkachenko and chairman of the Socialist Party Oleksandr Moroz. In addition, there are numerous
formally independent publications that are focused on reflecting perspectives of other political forces and their
leaders. The national information environment has been strictly divided between allies, antagonists, and oligarchs .
Involved in the general political process, the media have been used to reflect it in a way sees as appropriate by their
true owners and sponsors.
Once president of the Interfax Ukraina Information Agency Oleksandr Martynenko, subsequently the press secretary
for the President of Ukraine, admitted that there is no genuinely independent press in Ukraine. But this is true for the
whole world: a specific feature of the print media is that all publications are financed by these or those structures.
(Den, March 26, 1998). Another well-known Ukrainian journalist and an ORT Ukrainian correspondent argued that
all media outlets have their master, every master has interests. Like his interests, like the media's focus (Den,
February 10, 2000). The multiple comments of this kind reflect the existence of peculiar inner censorship that
restrains every individual journalist.
The Ukrainian media suffer, among other things, from indirect but actually very effective methods of pressure like
abrupt abolition of facility rent or equipment lease contracts and numerous inspections by taxation authorities or
representatives of local fire fighting departments. The methods were used during the 1999 presidential election
campaign. Some media received formally motivated visits of taxation authorities, fire and a variety of other
inspections, too frequent to be justified. Yet, the method proved to be effective when used in this country's neighbor
state that appears to serve as a model for most of election techniques applied in Ukraine. A Moscow-based
publication, Kommersant, known to be strongly critical of the Moscow government, was closed down with the help
of the Moscow fire inspection. In most of cases, charges made by inspection agencies are fully legitimate. In the
current heavily regulated environment, inconsistent legislation and broad opportunities for discretionary actions of
inspection authorities, it is not difficult to find evidence of noncompliance practically anywhere. Yet, to a certain
point inspectors prefer to turn the blind eye to such facts/ their scrutiny is highly selective, and choice of individual
targets suggest bias. As deputy editor-in-chief of Zerkalo Nedeli Yulia Mostova put it, only those who are friendly
with the authorities may afford such noncompliance (Den, August 28, 1999). No wonder zealous inspections by
taxation authorities and fire departments was noticed by the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe, and members of the Monitoring Committee suggested that the Ukrainian leadership should
introduce a moratorium on exerting pressure on the media and refrain from sanctioning inspections of the media by
taxation and fire authorities until the end of the presidential election campaign (Vechirniy Kyiv, October 7, 1999).
Yet, the election campaign is over, but opportunities to harass journalists and the media remain.
The adoption, in May 1993, of an amendment that envisaged liability for dissemination of false information that
may have damaged business reputation of an individual or an institution, opened new possibilities for using
Ukraine's far from always independent third estate , the judiciary, for harnessing and muffling the fourth estate .
Currently the law envisages disciplinary, administrative or criminal liability for humiliating honor and dignity of a
person without differentiating between information about a private individual - whose right for privacy is protected
in every democracy - and a civil servant or a public politician, whose job demands complete openness to public
scrutiny. As long as the right of the society to receive complete and true information about actions of its elected
leaders, representatives and civil servants is not really guaranteed by the law, there will be astronomic claims of
compensations for humiliated honor and dignity made by authorities, and the declared freedom of expression will
remain a predominantly theoretical option.
Although it is generally believed that the level of media freedom in Ukraine is noticeably higher than that in, say,
Belarus or Kazakhstan, the very comparison suggests how deep and massive the problem is. In fact, as far as the
freedom of speech is concerned, the comparison places Ukraine in the same class as the two other states. Analogies
of this kind may be regarded as the best evaluation of the level of the Ukrainian media freedom. On the other hand,
the broad public discussion of the level of the media freedom is itself an indicator of the presence of at least some
degree of freedom. Journalists are aware of the harness that is being put on them, and their awareness of the lack of
freedom to perform their professional duties properly is likely to reach the critical point soon. The evidence of that
transforming awareness includes the recent massive Wave of Freedom, the emigration of a number of opposition
journalists to Internet publications, and the Ukrainian authorities' attempts (so far unsuccessful) to establish control
over the information that is being disseminated via the Internet. Yet, the majority of the Ukrainian media continue to
choose the color of compromise, i.e., gray, and fail to perform their principle function of providing the society with
true and complete information
